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THE “LAW OF RAMSEY COUNTY” – REFLECTIONS OF A
TRIAL JUDGE ON STATE GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK
Judge Kathleen Gearin†
“A statesman gains little by the arbitrary exercise of ironclad
authority upon all occasions that offer[.] A little concession, now
and then, where it can do no harm is the wiser policy.”1
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INTRODUCTION

Partisan gridlock at the Minnesota State Capitol inevitably heads
south along a well-worn path from the Cass Gilbert-designed capitol
building to the Ramsey County District Court’s classic art deco structure.
During my tenure as Second Judicial District Chief Judge,2 I presided over
† Judge Kathleen Gearin served as a Minnesota Second Judicial District Judge for
twenty-six years, including four years as Chief Judge. She retired in 2013. The author
expresses her appreciation to Mitchell Hamline School of Law students Lori DockendorfNudd, Katherine McKim, and Heather O’Neill for their research and editorial assistance.
1. SAMUEL L. CLEMENS, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 141
(1917) (offering an account of Hank Morgan, a nineteenth-century New England resident,
forced to navigate the medieval English legal system following a journey through time and
space).
2. The Second Judicial District encompasses the City of St. Paul and its immediate
suburbs. The district is most commonly referred to as Ramsey County District Court. All
ten judicial districts in the state contain multiple counties except for the two with the largest
populations: Ramsey County and Hennepin County, which includes the City of
Minneapolis and its suburbs.
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two of these gridlock cases: Brayton v. Pawlenty in 20103 and In re

Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the
State of Minnesota in 2011.4 Despite the gravity of the constitutional issues
at stake in these cases, only the first resulted in a substantive decision by
the Minnesota Supreme Court.5 The procedural posture and actions of
the coordinate branches that ultimately resolved the 2005 state
government shutdown and the 2011 budget crisis resulted in supreme
court rulings that left the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the
judicial branch can order disbursements from the state treasury
unresolved.
The lack of prior appellate level review in these cases was put on full
display in the most recent government gridlock conflict, Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton.6 In that case, when then-Chief Judge
John Guthmann noted that no appellate court had ever passed judgment
on the legality of court ordered temporary funding, one party grasping for
an argument said, “[w]ell, it’s the law of Ramsey County.”7 Though it is
unlikely that Chief Judge Guthmann found the argument particularly
persuasive, it underscores the lack of clarity in this area of Minnesota
constitutional law. However, unlike these earlier cases, Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate did reach the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2017,
and its decision finally gave some guidance on how district courts should
respond to future government gridlock and what powers the Minnesota
Constitution confers on each branch. The decision, however, rests on
specific facts relating to the amount of operating funds available to the
legislature prior to the start of the next regularly scheduled session and
judicial restraint principles. That case will be discussed later in this article.
Part II of this article briefly describes the Minnesota state budgeting
process.8 Part III provides an overview of earlier Minnesota state

3. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010).
4. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion For
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch
of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011) (No. 62-CV-11-5203),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/62CV115203_Executive_findings_of_
fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WUW-3YVM].
5. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 357.
6. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017).
7. Briana Bierschbach, How One County Court Came to Play Such a Big Role In
Minnesota Politics, MINNPOST.COM (July 6, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2017/07/how-one-county-court-came-play-such-big-role-minnesota-politics/
[https://perma.cc/B63J-PZQZ].
8. Infra Part II.
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government shutdowns.9 Part IV summarizes the procedural history in the
Brayton and In re Temporary Funding.10 Part V describes Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate and discusses the challenges of balancing public
interests with the demands of the Minnesota Constitution.11 Part VI
concludes with a warning that the “law of Ramsey County” is evolving, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ninetieth Minnesota State
Senate makes it less likely that future Ramsey County chief judges will
authorize expenditures from the state treasury in the event of a shutdown.
It also makes it likely that if funding is judicially ordered, it will be far
narrower in scope.12 Finally, this article also suggests that Minnesota would
be better served by adopting a default budget statute, such as those used in
Wisconsin and Rhode Island, rather than continuing with the threat of
shutdowns.13
II.

STATE BUDGETING OVERVIEW

The Minnesota Constitution requires that the legislature and
governor adopt a balanced two-year budget (known as the biennial budget)
for state government operations.14 While the state constitution does not
expressly enumerate this balanced budget requirement—the issuance of
debt is only allowed for express purposes;15 borrowing money to pay for a
budget deficit is not one of those purposes.16
Minnesota law contemplates a collaborative budgeting process
between the executive and legislative branches. In January of every oddnumbered year, the governor, with the assistance of the state budgeting
agency, Minnesota Management and Budget, proposes a comprehensive
and balanced two-year state budget to the legislature.17 This proposal is
9. Infra Part III.
10. Infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1857); MINN. STAT. § 16A.04(1) (2017); MINN.
STAT. § 16A.11(2) (2017). See generally MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET
PROCESS, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2016), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides
/guides?issue=budget [https://perma.cc/Q3DP-3WWV].
15. See supra note 14. See also LEGISLATIVE PARTY CONTROL: A CHART, 1901 TO
THE

PRESENT, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2018), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/histor
y/caucus_table [https://perma.cc/TQV3-9J2H].
16. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
17. MINN. STAT. § 16A.11 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 16A.04 (2017). In addition to a
detailed operating budget, Minnesota Statute section 16A.11 directs the governor to submit
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further refined in late February or early March after new economic
forecast data becomes available.18 The governor and the legislature must
then reach an agreement on a balanced budget and enact the needed
appropriation and revenue laws by the first Monday following the third
Saturday in May—the date that the Minnesota Constitution requires the
legislature to adjourn.19 When the executive and legislative branches do
not reach an agreement, it creates a state government funding crisis, which
then ends up in the courts all too often. Like almost all lawsuits, they are
initiated at the district court level. In these cases, the venue is Ramsey
County district court—located in Minnesota’s capital city, St. Paul.
These statutory and constitutional requirements give the executive
and legislative branches about three and a half months to reach an
agreement on a state budget for the next two fiscal years. If no agreement
is reached by the May deadline, the governor may call a special legislative
session, which recalls legislators to the state capitol.20 Thus, the true
deadline of consequence for the legislative and executive branches to
reach a budget agreement is July 1 when the new fiscal year begins.21 If
they fail to reach an agreement by that date, it is unclear what should
happen. There are no statutes addressing what, if any, state treasury
disbursements are allowed absent appropriations bills passed by the
legislature and signed by the governor.
Minnesota is not the only state with a balanced budget requirement.
Forty-nine states require balanced budgets, with Vermont as the sole
exception.22 What constitutes a balanced budget, and what mechanisms
must be used to keep it balanced in the event revenues or expenses
outstrip expectations, varies from state to state. Despite the differences, the
balanced budget requirement is an enduring fixture of the state legislative
process (unlike at the federal level).

a “budget message” and a capital investment budget to the legislature. The capital
investment budget (or “bonding bill”) is submitted in even-numbered years. Id. at subdiv.
2, 4.
18. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.103 (2017). See also MINN. H.R., RESEARCH DEP’T,
THE
STATE BUDGET PROCESS (2016), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/gvst_sbp.as
px?src=14 [https://perma.cc/WNR7-DYSW].
19. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
20. Id.
21. See MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 14.
22. NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE
LEGIS. 2 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RLB-4XPT].
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While the balanced budget requirement is long-standing, the
frequency and severity of budgeting disputes between the legislative and
executive branches have increased significantly. At least nineteen states
have started new fiscal years without a final budget since 2002.23 Five of
these states—Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Minnesota—have experienced partial government shutdowns as a result.24
The federal government, even without a balanced budget requirement,
also has experienced nineteen funding gaps with varying degrees of severity
since 1976.25 While this article was being written, the federal government
endured the nineteenth and longest partial shutdown, lasting thirty-four
days, in United States history.26
Though there has been an uptick in government gridlock litigation in
recent years, it is not an all-together new phenomenon. There are at least
two other instances of partial government shutdowns or related litigation in
Minnesota history prior to the Brayton and In re Temporary Funding
cases.
III. THE RISE OF MINNESOTA STATE GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK
Differing opinions and divided government are hallmarks of
democratic governance. Minnesota is no different. Since 1901, the state
government in Minnesota has been divided for thirty-two out of the sixtythree biennial sessions.27 In the past thirty years, divided government has
become the norm.28 Single party control in Minnesota has occurred only
twice since 1990.29

23. See MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 14.
24. LATE STATE BUDGETS, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx [https://perma.cc/BBP6WC39].
25. See Ryan Struyk & Joyce Tseng, The History of US Government Shutdowns in 1
Chart,
CABLE
NEWS
NETWORK
(Jan.
3,
2018,
8:13
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/13/politics/us-government-shutdowns-budgetchart/index.html [https://perma.cc/3DMW-D8FL].
26. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates, & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was
the Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-governmentshutdown.html [https://perma.cc/USF3-XMET].
27. More than fifty percent of all Minnesota legislative sessions held since 1901 have
been divided. See LEGISLATIVE PARTY CONTROL, supra note 15.
28. See id.
29. Id.
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Averted Partial Government Shutdown in 2001

From the standpoint of political party affiliation, Minnesota’s 2001
Legislative Session was marked by a truly divided government.
Republicans held a majority in the House of Representatives.30 The
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) controlled the State Senate.31 Jesse
Ventura of the Independence Party occupied the Governor’s Office.32
Despite a state budget surplus, the legislature and governor struggled to
reach an agreement on how to spend it.33
When it became clear that a government shutdown might occur,
Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch petitioned the Ramsey County
District Court on June 20, 2001, asking that the core government functions
receive funding and authority to operate if the legislature did not enact
appropriations by the end of the 2001 fiscal year.34 The petition
acknowledged that article XI, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution
provides: “no money shall be paid out of the treasury of this State except
in pursuance of an appropriation by law” and that article IV gives the
Minnesota Legislature the power of appropriation.35 However, the petition
also asserted that state government is mandated by the Minnesota
Constitution, the United States Constitution, and federal law pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause36 to perform “certain services which are ‘core or
inherent’ functions [that] cannot be abridged by the legislative branch.”37
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. See also Laura McCallum, Politics on a Three-Legged Stool, MINN. PUB.

RADIO (May 3, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200105/03_mccallu
ml_budget/ [https://perma.cc/JQJ2-KHCQ].
33. The State Senate wanted to use half of the anticipated budget surplus for
transportation, health care and higher-education projects. Governor Ventura and the State
House of Representatives wanted to use the entire surplus to issue rebates to the public.
See McCallum, supra note 32.
34. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch
(Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001) (Cohen, C.J.) (No. C9-01-5725),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/other/090583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33X6-974N]
[hereinafter “District Court Order (June 2001)”]; Michael Khoo, With Shutdown Averted,
Legislature
Adjourns,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
(June
30, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200106/30_khoom_session/
[https://perma.cc/X28M-6L8E].
35. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 6 (quoting MINN. CONST. art.
XI, § 1).
36. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and
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The petition outlined broad definitions for the meaning of “core” or
“essential” government services, relying on criteria previously articulated
by the federal Office of Management and Budget and the United States
Attorney General during a federal government shutdown.38 Applying this
criteria to Minnesota, Attorney General Hatch requested a declaration that
(1) the executive branch must carry out core government functions as
required by the Minnesota Constitution, United States Constitution, and
federal law; (2) the state treasury shall issue checks and process funds
necessary to pay for these obligations; and (3) that each government entity
be allowed to determine its own core functions.39 The petition also called
for the appointment of a special master to resolve any issues relating to
core function determinations and payment for these services.40
The following day, June 21, Ramsey County Chief Judge Lawrence
Cohen set a hearing for June 29, two days before the start of the next fiscal
year.41 At that hearing, Judge Cohen issued the order granting the attorney
general’s motion for temporary funding, with payments to be made from
the state treasury for core functions from July 1, 2001, through July 23,
2001, until the legislature enacted the necessary appropriations bills or
until another order from the court.42
In response to concerns that a court order would upset the balance of
power between the three branches, Attorney General Hatch noted that
“there is a precedent for one branch of government [to] tread[] on the turf

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
37. Petition of Attorney General Mike Hatch at 4, In re Temporary Funding of Core
Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June
29, 2001) (No. C9-01-5725), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/other/090583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VDV9-5LUN].
38. Id. at 5. The criteria for what portions of government should receive funding and
the authority to operate was three-fold: (1) services necessary for national security; (2)
services necessary to perform contract obligations; and (3) services necessary to protect life
and property. Id.
39. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 7.
40. Id.
41. See Peter S. Wattson, Power of the Purse in Minnesota, MINN. SENATE
COUNSEL
§
IV
at
13–14
(July
17,
2017),
https://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/treatise/Power_of_the_Purse/Power_of_the_Purse.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TM5P-W3BT] (citing In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions
of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001) (Cohen, C.J.) (No. C9-015725)).
42. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 7.
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of another.”43 The attorney general reasoned, “[i]n the south with
desegregation, there were many times when courts would have to order
that school districts build schools so that kids could get educated. They
weren’t financed or appropriated by the legislature, the executive branch
wasn't building them, the courts ordered that it be done[.]”44
Ultimately, Chief Judge Cohen’s order was moot because the
legislature and governor agreed on a budget deal the next day, averting the
shutdown.45 However, the impasse did create a template for future
government gridlock: the legislature and governor unable to reach a
compromise followed by intervention by the attorney general. It also may
have communicated to the legislative and executive branches that judicial
intervention would soften the consequences of future budgetary
brinksmanship. Regardless of the implications of Judge Cohen’s order or
the lessons learned by the other branches, the pattern repeated itself only a
few years later.

B.

Partial Government Shutdown in 2005

During the 2005 Legislative Session, Republican Governor Tim
Pawlenty and the DFL-controlled legislature failed to timely enact
legislation authorizing funding for the largest spending areas: health,
human services, education, and transportation.46 Between the May
constitutional adjournment date and June 30, the legislature and governor
were unable to reach a compromise agreement that would stop a partial
government shutdown. The failure of the parties to reach an agreement by
July 1 marked the first time in Minnesota history that the legislature failed
to enact the necessary appropriation and revenue bills before the start of
the new biennium.47
In the months leading up to the partial government shutdown, it
became evident that a compromise agreement was unlikely. Attorney
General Hatch and Governor Pawlenty both filed petitions on June 15,
2005, requesting that the Ramsey County District Court authorize funding
43. Elizabeth Stawicki, Judge Steps Onto Legislature’s Turf, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(June 29, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200106/29_stawickie_judg
e/ [https://perma.cc/R5RQ-QCCL].
44. Id.
45. See Khoo, supra note 34.
46. See Wattson, supra note 41, at 13, 14; Tom Scheck, Minnesota State Shutdown
Ends with Early-Morning Deal, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2005),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/07/09_scheckt_day9/
[https://perma.cc/J3EX-PXLX].
47. Wattson, supra note 41.
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for certain core government functions in anticipation of a possible partial
shutdown on July 1.48 Attorney General Hatch again argued that the
legislature had failed to fulfill its duty to provide appropriations, leaving
executive branch officials, the agencies, and other government entities
unable to carry out their mandates to provide required key functions and
services for Minnesotans.49 Thus, a judicial order was necessary to avert
the looming emergency and ensure that critical services required by the
Minnesota Constitution, the United States Constitution, federal statute or
regulation would continue during a shutdown.50 Governor Pawlenty’s
petition relied in part on a principle announced in a 1976 Minnesota case
that addressed the separation of powers, stating that when “‘established
and reasonable procedures have failed’51 to result in sufficient
appropriations for constitutionally-mandated functions, this Court . . . may
provide relief to aggrieved officials.”52
Through their petitions, both Governor Pawlenty and Attorney
General Hatch further sought a declaration that the legislature’s failure to
approve appropriations necessitated that the governor and executive
branch officials have authorization to carry out “core functions” and
“critical services,” and that the finance commissioner have authority to
issue checks to ensure payment for these functions and services.53 The
attorney general also requested the appointment of a special master for the
purpose of hearing disputes and providing recommendations to the court
for any additional funding.54
On June 23, Ramsey County Chief Judge Johnson ordered that the
state continue funding programs and services as laid out in the “core and
critical functions list,” noting that the court was not making any
determination about the number of employees required to carry out those
48. Petition of Governor Tim Pawlenty at 3, In re Temporary Funding of Core
Functions of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2005) (No. CO-055928), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Petitions_by_Tim_Pawlenty.p
df [https://perma.cc/6NTG-YFQD] [hereinafter “Pawlenty Petition”]; Petition of Attorney
General Mike Hatch, at 6, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec.
Branch
(Ramsey
Cty.
Dist.
Ct.
June
15,
2005)
(No.
CO-055928), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Petitions_by_Mike_Hatch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9YB-SM38] [hereinafter “Hatch Petition (June 2005)”].
49. Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 2.
50. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 3 (internal footnotes and citations omitted);
Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 6.
51. Clerk of Courts Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 781
(Minn. 1976).
52. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 2.
53. Id. at 7; Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 7.
54. Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 7–8.
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functions.55 Chief Judge Johnson’s order relied on the principle that each
of the six executive branch constitutional officers specified in article X of
the Minnesota Constitution are required to “perform certain core
functions which are an inherent part of their Offices. Performance of these
core functions may not be abridged.”56 Moreover, the failure to fund these
core services would nullify the offices in violation of the Minnesota
Constitution.57 Echoing Attorney General Hatch’s core function criteria
from 2001, the district court concluded that a “critical service” was one
necessary to “protect the lives, health and safety of those residing in
Minnesota; or, safeguard public property against loss or casualty during
any period in which government services may be interrupted.”58
The order directed an appointed special master to determine
whether particular government programs constituted “critical services.”
Then, only after the special master’s approval, the finance commissioner
would make payments from the state treasury for continued operations.59
The order’s effect was immediate. Per its terms, the order would remain
in effect until July 23, 2005, the enactment of a complete state budget, or
further order of the court.60 Notably, there were no appeals or challenges
made to the order at that time.
The order remained in effect for nine days until the legislature and
governor enacted a “lights on” temporary spending bill that allowed the
non-funded agencies and programs to receive the same amounts they were
allocated in the previous appropriation bills.61 The legislature and governor
finally reached agreement on July 14. Attempting to blunt the
constitutionally questionable nature of court-ordered treasury
disbursements, or lessen the public criticisms of the shutdown, the
legislature included language that made the two-year appropriations
retroactive to July 1, 2005.62
55. In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for Temporary Funding, at Ex. B,
(Ramsey
Cty.
Dist.
Ct.
June
23,
2005)
(No.
C9-05-5928),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Order_by_Judge_Gregg_Johnson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW3J-773V] [hereinafter “District Court Order (June 2005)”].
56. Id. at 7 (citing State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W. 2d 777 (Minn.
1986)).
57. District Court Order (June 2005), supra note 55, at 7.
58. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 3–4.
59. District Court Order (June 2005), supra note 55, at 8.
60. Id. at 9.
61. 2005 Minn. Laws 2273.
62. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) (No. 62-C905-9413), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/C9-059413_Order_and_Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX33-GZ95]. Each of these bills
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This language became important when legislators filed quo warranto63
petitions to stop future state fund disbursements by the executive branch
without an appropriation. The petitions were intended to spark appellate
review of the underlying constitutional issues that surface when courts are
asked to order appropriations as a perceived last resort.64
On August 31, 2005, thirteen state legislators filed a petition for a writ
of quo warranto in the Minnesota Supreme Court against Finance
Commissioner Peggy Ingison, challenging the constitutionality of court
ordered expenditures.65 They sought an order “requiring [Commissioner
Ingison] and her successors to cease and desist from any further
disbursements of state funds at the end of the fiscal biennium without
appropriation by law.”66 The justices concluded that the reasons provided
by petitioners for initiating their action in the Supreme Court were
insufficient to overcome the requirement that quo warranto proceedings
begin in district court. The petition was dismissed without prejudice on
September 9, 2005.67
On September 28, 2005, the legislators refiled their petition for a writ
of quo warranto in Ramsey County District Court. Their petition asked
the district court to issue a writ of quo warranto to Finance Commissioner
Ingison requiring her to show by what constitutional authority she
disbursed state funds at the end of a biennium without an appropriation by
law; or in absence of such showing, to require her and her successor to

contained the following language with minor differences, but with the same effect:
“Appropriations in this act are effective retroactively from July 1, 2005, and supersede and
replace funding authorized by the Ramsey District Court . . . as well as by Laws 2005 1st
Spec Session Chapter 2, which provided necessary funding through July 14, 2005[.]” See
generally 2005 Minn. Laws 2454 (health and human services); 2005 Minn. Laws 2790
(education); 2005 Minn. Laws 2941 (transportation).
63. A writ of quo warranto is a proceeding that “inquire[s] [into] whether authority
existed to justify or authorize certain acts of a public character or interest.” The Latin
translation is roughly “by what authority” or “by what warrant?” Quo Warranto, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting CHARLES HERMAN KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 662 (2d ed. 1952)).
64. Wattson, supra note 41.
65. Sup. Ct. Or. Denying Pet. Quo Warranto, State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison (Minn.
Sept. 9, 2005) (No. A05-1742) (“[Petitioners] seek an order requiring respondent and her
successors to cease and desist from any further disbursements of state funds at the end of
the
fiscal
biennium
without
an
appropriation
by
law.”),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/A051742_SupCt_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5VH-KW8T].
66. Sup. Ct. Or. Denying Pet. Quo Warranto, supra note 65, at 1–2.
67. Id. at 5.
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cease and desist from any further future state funding disbursements
without an appropriation by law.68
Chief Judge Johnson, who issued the prior order, denied this writ in
its entirety, reasoning that the legislators were precluded from bringing
their claim because “the writ by its very nature is not available to challenge
past conduct. The writ is intended to apply to situations involving a
continuing course of unauthorized usurpation of authority”69 and here,
there was no continuing, unauthorized usurpation.70 The court also wrote
that petitioners failed to meet the standard that the “challenged conduct is
capable of repetition, yet likely to evade judicial review” established in
Elzle v. Commissioner of Public Safety.71 In a nod to the issue’s moot
nature, Chief Judge Johnson further explained that the legislature
ultimately enacted language ratifying the funding ordered by the district
court.72
Chief Judge Johnson next defended the constitutionality of the
original decision to provide funding for core government services. Chief
Judge Johnson reasoned, “[t]he constitution of the state of Minnesota . . .
is not a ‘suicide pact’ and must be interpreted to further its principle
purpose of preserving the state.”73 Chief Judge Johnson explained, “[t]he
executive and judicial branches must retain the right and duty to respond
to such emergencies as presented here by the inability of the legislative
branch to fulfill its constitutional duty.”74 He added judicial intervention in

68. Brief of Petitioners and Appendix Vol. 1 of 2 at 8–9, State ex rel. Sviggum v.
Ingison (Dist. Ct. Ramsey Cty. 2005) (No. 62-C9-05-9413) (providing chronological
history).
69. State ex rel., 62-C9-05-9413 at 5. See also State ex. rel. Lommen v. Gravlin, 295
N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1941); State ex. rel. Groybach v. Common School District No. 65, 54
N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1952) (“[T]he writ of quo warranto is not allowable as preventive of,
or remedy for, official misconduct and cannot be employed to test the legality of the official
action of public or corporate officers.”).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 6 (citing Elzle v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29 (Minn.
1980); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005)).
72. Id. at 3.
73. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison, at 8 (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) (No.
62-C9-05-941) (citing Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W. 3d 852, 873–77 (Ky. 2005)
(holding that constitutional separation of powers provisions must be interpreted to further
its
purpose
of
supporting
an
enduring
republic)),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/C9-059413_Order_and_Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX33-GZ95].
74. Id.
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this case “was done with caution in order to ensure funding for core
services of government related to life, health and safety.”75
The legislators appealed Chief Judge Johnson’s dismissal to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.76 The court of appeals largely affirmed the
district court’s decision except for the conclusion that the action was
barred by the doctrine of laches.77 The court reasoned that even though
the legislators may have foregone an opportunity to participate in the initial
proceeding, it could not “conclude that they unreasonably delayed the
assertion of their rights to question the constitutionality of the resulting
decision.”78
Acknowledging that the litigation’s purpose was to obtain appellate
review of the Ramsey County District Court, which had been fruitless thus
far, the court of appeals decision characterized the action as “seeking a
declaration that the funds the commissioner disbursed under district
court’s authorization and without legislative appropriation were
unconstitutional and an order requiring the commissioner to cease
disbursements.”79 However, the court of appeals ultimately decided not to
address these questions, citing the plain language of the legislature’s
retroactive appropriations bills.80 The court of appeals stated that, “[t]he
judiciary does not have the constitutional power to ‘relegislate’ the effect of
the legislature’s appropriations decisions.”81
Thus, the legislature successfully superseded the district court in
authorizing the executive disbursements.82 In other words, it was as if Judge
Johnson’s order never existed. The court then went on to urge the
legislature to pass legislation that would address future budget impasses.
The court explained, “it is the legislature and not the judiciary that has the
institutional competency to devise a prospective plan for resolving future
political impasses.”83
Judge Harriet Lansing, writing for the court, gently suggested two
ways that the legislature could prevent another judicially-mandated

75.
76.
2007).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
2007).
82.
83.

Id.
See State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 315–17 (Minn. Ct. App.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 323.
See State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct. App.
See id.
Id.
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disbursement of public funds during a budgetary impasse.84 First, the
legislature could create an emergency fund to keep the government
functioning.85 Second, the legislature could enact “a statute setting forth the
procedures to be followed during a budgetary impasse.”86
However, between the issuance of this opinion and the next budget
impasse in 2011, no legislation was enacted to replace the practice of the
attorney general filing lawsuits in Ramsey County District Court asking for
judicial involvement when the other branches were unwilling to settle
budgetary differences. That legislative inaction left “the law of Ramsey
County” intact and the constitutional arguments unresolved. While the
court of appeals declined to rule on the constitutional issue, it
acknowledged the issue’s importance in dicta: “[w]e recognize the
legislators’ compelling argument that the commissioner’s court-approved
disbursements interfered with their appropriations power and improperly
affected the dynamics of the legislative process during the special
session.”87 This statement likely was little consolation to the legislators who
sought the review.
IV. GRIDLOCK REACHES RAMSEY COUNTY COURT AGAIN

A.

Brayton v. Pawlenty in 2010

A few years later, I dealt with my first government gridlock case as
Ramsey County Chief Judge. The facts differed somewhat from the 2001
and 2005 shutdown cases. Instead of the legislature and governor failing to
agree on spending, they agreed to a state budget that was almost certain to
exceed projected state revenues—which is exactly what happened.88
As discussed above, Minnesota state government operates on a twoyear budget cycle.89 Each biennial budget is comprised of revenues and
expenditures established in bills passed by the legislature and signed into
law by the governor.90 Minnesota Management and Budget is required to
regularly prepare a series of anticipated revenue and expenditure

84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–60 (Minn. 2010) (summarizing
the history of the 2009 legislative session culminating in the failure of the legislature and
governor to agree on a projected balanced budget).
89. See generally supra Part II.
90. See generally supra Part II.
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forecasts.91 To develop each forecast, the department relies on reports
from macroeconomic consultants, anticipated demographic changes, and
additional analysis from the state economist.92
The November 2008 forecast for the 2010–2011 biennium was
bleak. Minnesota Management and Budget projected that the state
government would have a $4.847 billion budget deficit.93 The department
came to essentially the same conclusion in February 2009.94 These budget
forecasts made clear that expenditure cuts or revenue increases were
necessary to balance the 2010–2011 budget as required by the Minnesota
Constitution.95
Considering this forecast, Governor Pawlenty’s proposed budget
resolved the expected deficit through expenditure reductions.96 During the
legislative session, the legislature passed appropriations bills between May
4 and May 18 that reduced expenditures, but it was still not enough to
overcome the forecasted deficit.97 To resolve the balance, the legislature
passed a revenue bill that would have solved the remaining shortfall by
increasing taxes. The governor vetoed that bill on May 9, which the
legislature failed to override.98
On May 14, Governor Pawlenty announced at a controversial press
conference that if a compromise budget deal was not reached, there would

91. See generally supra Part II. The Minnesota Department of Finance was merged
with the Minnesota Department of Employee Relations to create Minnesota Management
and Budget in 2008. The Finance Commissioner, who was a frequent party in these earlier
gridlock cases, would be replaced by the Management and Budget Commissioner in the
later proceedings. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Tim Pawlenty, Governor
Pawlenty Announces Merger of Employee Relations Department Completed on Schedule
(May
30,
2008),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2010/other/101582/www.governor.state.mn.us/mediacent
er/pressreleases/2008/PROD008976.html [https://perma.cc/DEJ2-YKXJ].
92. MINN. STAT. § 16A.103 (2017). See also Forecast Overview, MINNESOTA
MANAGEMENT
AND
BUDGET,
https://mn.gov/mmb/forecast/overview/
[https://perma.cc/LD74-2DC9] (describing the state of Minnesota’s budget forecasting
procedures).
93. MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, MINNESOTA FINANCIAL REPORT: NOVEMBER
FORECAST
(2008),
https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/Budget-Economic-ForecastNov2008_tcm1059-228633.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2R7-XLNJ].
94. See MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, MINNESOTA FINANCIAL REPORT: FEBRUARY
FORECAST
(2009),
https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/Budget-Economic-ForecastFeb2009_tcm1059-228598.pdf [https://perma.cc/45QY-3HA8].
95. See id.
96. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 359–60.
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be neither a special session nor a shutdown.99 Instead, he would use the
state’s unallotment statute to balance the budget.100 The unallotment statute
provides the executive branch authority to reduce unexpended allotments
when the Minnesota Management and Budget Commissioner determines
that “probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated,
and that the amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be
less than needed.”101 The statute does not define or put timelines on the
phrases “less than anticipated” or “less than needed.”102
On the last day of the session, May 18, the legislature ignored the
governor’s warning and passed another revenue bill to address the
remaining $2.7 billion projected deficit after the enactment of the
appropriations bills.103 The governor vetoed the bill.104 As a result, a
projected $2.7 billion deficit remained unresolved by the legislature—
setting the stage for the lawsuit that followed.105
On November 3, 2009, Deanna Brayton filed suit in Ramsey County
District Court against Governor Pawlenty, Minnesota Management and
Budget, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and the
Minnesota Department of Revenue seeking a temporary injunction on
behalf of low-income residents who received Minnesota Supplemental
Special Diet Assistance.106 State payments to the program had stopped two
days earlier on November 1 because the governor’s unallotment plan
significantly reduced the available appropriations for the Minnesota
Department of Human Services from the levels enacted in May.107 The

99. Mark Brunswick & Mike Kaszuba, Pawlenty Issues Ultimatum on State
Budget, STAR TRIB. (May 15, 2009, 10:06 AM), http://www.startribune.com/pawlentyissues-ultimatum-on-state-budget/45042272/ [https://perma.cc/R7QP-3DXG].
100. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 16A.152(4) (2017).
101. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152(4) (2017).
102. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.011 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 (2017).
103. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 359–60.
106. Class Action Complaint of Plaintiffs, Brayton v. Pawlenty (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct.
Dec.
30,
2009)
(No.
62-CV-09-1169),
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/2/Public/Civil/1%20Pawlenty%201139/Summons_an
d_Complaint_Nov_3_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6A-EXA4] [hereinafter “Brayton Class
Action Complaint”].
107. See id. Unallotment is a procedure by which previously appropriated funding is
held back to ensure the state budget remains balanced between legislative sessions. See id.
It has been used by at least three Minnesota governors since 1980. Governor Pawlenty’s
2009 unallotment plan would have restricted $2.68 billion in previously approved state
funding. See generally Colbey Sullivan and Elizabeth Klarqvist, Unallotment: Executive
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complaint asked the district court to order the executive branch to
reinstate funding for the Special Diet Plan Assistance program during the
litigation.108
On December 30, 2009, an order was filed enjoining the defendants
from reducing the allotment to the program retroactive to November 1,
2009.109 The order found that while the unallotment statute was
constitutional, the governor had used his powers under this statute in an
unconstitutional manner, given the unique facts of the case discussed
above.110
The unallotment statute’s constitutionality previously had been
addressed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling in Rukavina v.
Pawlenty, which held that the unallotment statute was constitutional.111
Because of this controlling precedent, the decision not to rule the statute
itself unconstitutional was an easy one. It was, as the court reasoned in
their injunction order, “the specific manner in which the Governor
exercised his unallotment authority that trod upon the constitutional
power of the Legislature.”112 Moreover, the “authority of the Governor to
unallot [was] . . . intended to save the state in times of a previously
unforeseen budget crisis.” 113 It was “not meant to be used as a weapon by
the executive branch to break” a budget impasse or “to rewrite the
appropriations bill.”114 Because the projected budget shortfall “was neither
unknown nor unanticipated when the appropriation bills became law,” the

Branch Power to Reduce Spending to Avoid a Deficit, MINN. H.R., RESEARCH DEP’T
(2018),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/unallot.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33JT-Z6CU];
MINN. ISSUES RES. GUIDES: UNALLOTMENT, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2018),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=unallotment [https://perma.cc/4LRBEYD2].
108. See Brayton Class Action Complaint, at 25.
109. See Order, Brayton v. Pawlenty, (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009) (Gearin,
C.J.)
(62-CV-09-11693),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/guides/Unallotment/order2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M3LQ-RAQQ] [hereinafter “Brayton Order (December 2009)”].
110. See id.
111. See Rukavina v. Pawlenty, 684 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004) (“We conclude that Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, does not reflect
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, but only enables the executive to protect
the state from financial crisis in a manner designated by the legislature.”).
112. Brayton Order (December 2009), at 4.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id.
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executive branch’s use of the unallotment authority was invalid and
violated separation of powers principles.115
The parties agreed that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit
should be denied and requested final judgment for the plaintiffs be
entered instead of continuing the matter for further proceedings in the trial
court. This paved the way for an expedited appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.116 The supreme court upheld the trial court ruling, in a
four-to-three decision. The decision was upheld, not because it found that
the governor’s actions were unconstitutional because they violated
separation of powers principles, but because the governor’s actions
exceeded the statutory authority granted to him by the legislature.117 The
decision followed the established appellate court principle of avoiding a
constitutional ruling when there is another basis on which the case can be
decided.118
Appellants argued that the unallotment statute gives the executive
branch authority to modify spending decisions regardless of whether the
shortfall results from lower revenues than expected, veto of a revenue bill,
or the governor’s decision not to sign adequate revenue legislation passed
by both branches of the legislature.119 The court rejected that interpretation
of the statute because it would give the executive branch too broad a role
in the creation of biennial budgets.120 The legislature and governor never
reached an agreement on what amounts should be appropriated and if any
revenues should be raised to achieve a balanced budget in 2009.121
Appropriations bills were passed and signed, but revenue bills were not—
meaning that a balanced budget for the 2010-2011 biennium was never
enacted.122 The court held that the statute only provides the executive
branch authority to address an unanticipated budget deficit after the
legislative and executive branches have enacted a balanced budget.123
Applying this reasoning, the Special Diet Program unallotment was found
to be unlawful and void because the 2009 budget-making process was
never completed.124
115. Id. at 6.
116. See id.
117. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010).
118. In re Sentry-Haugen, 583 N.W. 2d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998).
119. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 367.
120. See id. at 368.
121. See generally id. at 359–62 (resolving the unallotment authority of the executive
branch but never addressing the question of how to achieve a balanced budget in 2009).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 368.
124. See id.
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The supreme court majority also noted how the governor’s actions
represented a threat to separation of powers.125 The court explained, “[t]he
statute does not shift to the executive branch a broad budget-making
authority allowing the executive branch to address a deficit that remains
after a legislative session because the legislative and executive branches
have not resolved their differences.”126 Brayton was the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s first substantive ruling after a decade of litigation on
budget conflicts between the legislative and executive branches. It
established a meaningful limitation on executive authority in the budget
process—denying the governor the ability to use the unallotment statute to
avoid a government shutdown during an impasse.

B.

In re Temporary Funding Litigation in 2011

For most Minnesotans, the 2011 government shutdown began at
midnight on July 1. For me, it started six months earlier, when Politics in
Minnesota published its annual January legislative session preview. The
cover article was entitled “The Decider” featuring my photo. It predicted if
the legislative and executive branches failed to resolve the looming budget
issues, the Ramsey County Chief Judge would preside over any
government shutdown litigation.127 As chief judge, I knew that the
prediction was accurate. I did not relish the possibility. I already had
handled the politically sensitive unallotment case, served on the canvassing
board in the 2008 Franken-Coleman Senate election recount, and led the
Ramsey County courts during the 2008 Republican National Convention,
held in St. Paul, and its aftermath.128
By mid-June 2011 it was evident that the discussions between DFL
Governor Dayton and the Republican-controlled legislature were
deadlocked. The governor stated that he would not call a special session of
125. Id.
126. Id. See also id. at 369 (Page J., concurring) (“Under our definition of pure
legislative power, the sweeping discretion granted by section 16A.152, subdivision 4, to
modify and negate legislative spending decisions raises serious separation of powers
concerns.”).
127. Jake Grovum, Gearin: ‘I’ve Had the Chief Judgeship From Hell’, MINNESOTA
LAWYER
(July
22,
2011),
https://minnlawyer.com/2011/07/22/gearin%E2%80%98i%E2%80%99ve-had-the-chief-judgeship-from-hell%E2%80%99/
[https://perma.cc/LKY4-N5HG].
128. Id. More than 800 people were arrested during the 2008 Republican National
Convention in St. Paul, including 300 people on the first day of the event. Colin Moynihan,
For the Police and Protesters, a Quieter Convention, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/us/politics/for-police-and-protesters-a-quieterconvention.html [https://perma.cc/5BS4-V56P].
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the legislature to pass appropriation bills in the absence of a compromise.
Not unexpectedly, a “shutdown” funding lawsuit was filed in Ramsey
County.129
Like the prior lawsuits handled by Chief Judges Cohen and Johnson,
the attorney general initiated it. After discussions between legislative
leaders and the governor failed to produce any significant movement
towards compromise, on June 13, Attorney General Lori Swanson filed a
petition seeking an order directing state government to fund executive
branch core functions.130 It also asked the court to appoint a special master
to resolve any issues concerning the order’s terms.131
An order to show cause was signed and a hearing was set for June
132
23. The order uncorked a deluge of phone calls and letters to my
chambers urging me to order continued funding for specific government
services and programs. The dispute placed me in the difficult position of
applying the law to a political conflict with real and immediate
consequences. The calls included dozens of pleas to ensure that the
animals at the Oliver H. Kelly Farm, run by the Minnesota Historical
Society, and the Minnesota Zoo received food and care. There were
dozens of calls from businesses and individuals who were unable to renew
the licenses they needed to make a living. Construction companies
worried they would be unable to complete road projects before winter.
Worried citizens called wondering if they would get state processed social
service payments, if state parks would be open, or if their state jobs would
be considered critical.
Governor Dayton filed his response to Attorney General Swanson on
the same day as the order to show cause was issued.133 Unlike Governor
129. Petition of Attorney General Lori Swanson, In re Temporary Funding of Core
Functions of the Exec. Branch of the State of Minn. (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 13, 2011)
(No.
62-CV-11-5203),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/62CV115203_Petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4M9-KQRP].
130. Id. at 7–8.
131. Id.
132. See Motion of the State of Minnesota to Consolidate at 3, In re Temporary
Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch of the State of Minn. (Ramsey Cty. Dist.
Ct.
June
30,
2011)
(No.
62-CV-11-5203),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A111107_AGs_Motion_to_Consolidate.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AXY-K82K].
133. See Response of the Governor to the Petition of the Attorney General, In re
Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June
15,
2011)
(No.
62-CV-11-5203),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/62CV115203_Response_Governor_P
etition.pdf [https://perma.cc/2668-35NM].
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Pawlenty in 2001 and 2005, Governor Dayton opposed the petition
despite recognizing that “[a] government shutdown would threaten the
lives and safety of the people of Minnesota.”134 He urged the court to order
the parties into mediation and forego issuing any other order for relief
unless and until mediation failed.135 He also argued that the office of the
governor has a number of inherent and statutory powers and that if the
legislature fails to pass appropriations bills that are either signed by the
governor or have the support of a two-thirds majority in each house
necessary to override a gubernatorial veto, he would use these executive
powers to fund core government functions.136
Following the initial hearing on Attorney General Swanson’s petition,
an order was issued denying both the motion to order the parties into
mediation and the motion to stay the proceedings.137 The House of
Representatives and the State Senate appeared through counsel at that
hearing and opposed mandatory mediation.138 The June 27 order denying
the request that the courts direct the executive and legislative branches to
engage in mediation cited article III of the Minnesota Constitution and
State ex. rel. Birkeland v. Christianson.139 In Birkeland, the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained:
The three departments of state government, the legislative,
executive, and judicial, are independent of each other. Neither
department can control, coerce, or restrain the action or
nonaction of either of the others in the exercise of any official
power or duty conferred by the Constitution, or by valid law,
involving the exercise of discretion.140
The funding order was filed on June 29, which was the latest I
believed I could delay in the hope that the other branches would resolve
the issue.141 The order directed Minnesota Management and Budget to
134. Id. at 1.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 6–7.
137. Order Denying Mediation at 1, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of
the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 27, 2011) (No.
62-CV-11-5203),
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/2/Public/Civil/Order_Denying_Mediation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EQV-SFMU].
138. Id.
139. See id. at 2 (citing State ex. rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 229 N.W. 313, 314
(Minn. 1930)).
140. State ex. rel. Birkeland, 229 N.W. 313 at 314.
141. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch
of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011) (No. 62-CV-11-5203).
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issue checks, process funds, and make payments necessary to carry out the
performance of the critical functions of government identified in the
order.142 It went into effect at midnight on June 30 and was scheduled to
expire on July 31, or earlier if a budget was enacted before that date.143
To justify the disbursements that had not been appropriated by the
legislature, the order relied on the totality of the Minnesota Constitution
and Minnesota cases addressing similar issues. The analysis centered on
article I, section 1, which states that “[g]overnment is instituted for the
security, benefit, and protection of the people in whom all political power
is inherent” and the articles establishing three separate branches, to justify
ordering un-appropriated disbursements.144
The cases cited to provide support for the order were State ex. rel
Mattson v. Kiedrowski145 and Clerk of Court’s Compensation for Lyon
County v. Lyon County Commissioners.146 In the first case, State Treasurer
Robert Mattson sought a writ of quo warranto directing Finance
Commissioner Jay Kiedrowski to refrain from executing the State
Treasurer’s duties as required by a new statute that transferred some of the
office’s responsibilities and employees to the Finance Department.147 The
supreme court granted the writ and declared the statute unconstitutional.
The court reasoned that it had the authority to make the decision, in part,
because “the Legislature should have known that it could not denude the
office of its inherent powers and duties even though they had been
prescribed by statute, and leave the office as an empty shell.”148
The second case, Lyon County, considered whether the Fifth Judicial
District could order the Lyon County Board of Commissioners to pay a
specific salary for the clerk of court.149 The supreme court reversed the
district court’s order because available legislative-administrative procedures
had not been exhausted before the order.150 The court also acknowledged
that the judicial branch has inherent power to keep another branch from
effectively abolishing a different branch “through [the] exercise of financial
and regulatory authority.”151 Both Mattson and Lyon County illustrate a
142. See id. at 16–18.
143. See id.
144. MINN. CONST. art. I. § 1.
145. 391 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986).
146. 241 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1976).
147. State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W. 2d 777, 778 (Minn. 1986).
148. Id. at 780–81 (quoting Hudson v. Kelly, 263 P.2d 362, 368 (Ariz. 1953)).
149. Clerk of Courts Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 781,
782 (Minn. 1976).
150. Id. at 787.
151. Id. at 784.

524

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

recognition by the supreme court that if the judicial branch lacked the
power to stop “unreasonable and intrusive assertions of such authority,” it
would make “separation of powers . . . a myth.”152
Ultimately, last minute efforts to avert the 2011 government
shutdown failed and the order went into effect at midnight on June 30. For
the next twenty days, millions of dollars were disbursed from the state
treasury, daily hearings were held before myself and Special Master
Kathleen Blatz (a former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice and
former state legislator), approximately 19,000 state employees were laid off
and began to receive unemployment compensation, state parks and
highway rest stops were closed, construction projects stopped, and millions
of citizens were without services they previously received.153
Given that nearly none of the two-year budget bills had been enacted,
there would be hundreds of requests from parties wanting to be included
in the critical core function category. It was impossible to fully anticipate
the breadth and complexity of the funding process. It soon became
evident that the judicial branch lacked the “institutional competency” to
comfortably unravel the different funding mechanisms contained in
hundreds of funding statutes.154
Judges are legal generalists. Yet, Special Master Blatz and I had to
quickly try to make decisions regarding funding provisions, priorities, and
mechanisms that had taken legislators, commissioners, and experienced
staff members years to comprehend. This proved to be no easy task. For
example, some state budget issues involve federal programs, and within
this category are programs that appear to fall under the Supremacy Clause,
programs where the state seems to act as a funding conduit, and programs
that require matching funds from the state. Other programs are funded
almost exclusively by the state, but with some federal funds. Some are
federal grants administered by state employees who make the
disbursement decisions and who also audit and manage the funds. Finally,

152. Id.
153. MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, STATE GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2 (2011),
https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/2011-shutdown-report-October-2011_tcm1059-125041.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYX2-NW84].
154. Unfortunately, this was not a new problem. Minnesota courts grappled with this
same challenge of addressing the consequences of a shutdown in prior government
gridlock cases. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007) (“Not only is the question nonjusticiable from the courts’ standpoint, but,
because of the structure and function of legislative power, it is the legislature and not the
judiciary that has the institutional competency to devise a prospective plan for resolving
future political impasses.”).
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some state statutes fund programs continuously and do not require a new
appropriation in the biennial budget.
As a result, some early decisions would change as the parties had a
chance to fully argue the impacts of their requests and educate the court
about the ways in which their client’s funding was not dependent upon
biennial appropriations. For example, after a July 1 hearing, the Minnesota
Zoological Society successfully argued that it operated under a statute that
established a continuous standing appropriation. Therefore, the
Minnesota Zoo could reopen.155
As the budget standoff continued, the funding requests escalated to
parties that needed state government permits and licenses. For example,
loggers needed permits to take their harvested wood from the state forests
to market. The lawyers representing them made it clear that for the people
in Koochiching County on the Canadian border, the state lumber
permitting agent’s function was more critical to them than police officers
or firemen. The black and red flannel-shirted loggers who came to the
hearing were clearly angry about the financial hardship caused by the
shutdown and worried about how they would support their families.
Despite their sincere concerns, the district court ruled that state law did
not extend far enough for the court to justify granting their request.156
In a similar instance, liquor retailers needed state permits called
“buyers cards” in order to buy alcohol from wholesalers. A request to
order the state to issue those permits also was denied.157 The growing
threat of Minnesota bars running out of beer during the heat of late-July
may well have hastened the final resolution of the crisis.158
Despite the significant constitutional questions raised by the judicially
ordered disbursements that were made from July 1 until July 21, the
Minnesota Supreme Court only addressed the 2011 shutdown through

155. See Minnesota Zoo to Remain Open During State Government Shutdown, ST.
PAUL
PIONEER
PRESS
(July
1,
2011,
11:01
PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2011/07/01/minnesota-zoo-to-remain-open-during-stategovernment-shutdown/ [https://perma.cc/Y5UK-2YUA].
156. See MINN. FOREST RES. COUNCIL, MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL
2011 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SUSTAINABLE
FOREST
RESOURCES
ACT
10
(2011),
https://mn.gov/frc/docs/MFRC_2011_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E26K-KZLJ].
157. See Eric Roper, One by One, Bars Get Tapped Out, STAR TRIB. (July 12, 2011,
10:58
PM),
http://www.startribune.com/one-by-one-bars-get-tapped-out/125459928/
[https://perma.cc/TVJ7-2TUG].
158. Id.
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orders issued in response to two writs of quo warranto.159 Like the 2005
writs, they were filed by state legislators.160 The first writ was filed on June
20. It was opposed by the attorney general and the governor. The supreme
court dismissed this petition without prejudice.161 In its order, the court
concluded that the petition did not satisfy the established standards for the
exercise of original jurisdiction for a writ of quo warranto.162 “While this
court retains its original jurisdiction . . . we today signal our future
intention to exercise that discretion in only the most exigent of
circumstances.”163
The legislators filed a second writ of quo warranto on July 8, 2011.164
By this time, Minnesota Management and Budget was making
disbursements pursuant to my original and follow-up orders. The
petitioners argued that the circumstances were exigent because, in their
view, the court and special master had “exceeded the jurisdictional
boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine and have indulged in the
constitutional powers reserved for the executive and legislative branches of
government.”165 Heeding the lesson of Swiggum, the petitioners wisely filed
before the budget issues were resolved and while the court ordered
disbursements were still being made.
On July 11, the supreme court agreed to hear the case and arguments
were scheduled on July 22.166 Escaping review once again, the executive
and legislative branches finally reached a compromise budget agreement
the day before the hearing. The supreme court issued its order dismissing
the second petition on November 30, 2011.167 By then, the governor and
159. See Order to Dismiss, Limmer v. Swanson (Minn. June 22, 2011) (No. A111107), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A11-1107_Order_Dismiss.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BR69-XWJK] [hereinafter “Order to Dismiss”]; Limmer v. Swanson,
806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 2011) (noting that because the constitutional questions had
become moot by the time of the order, the court may and did decline to address the
constitutional questions).
160. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Limmer v. Swanson (Minn. June 20, 2011)
(No.
A11-1107),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A111107_Petition_for_Writ_of_Quo_Warrento.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2HV-DZKD].
161. Order to Dismiss, supra note 159, at 2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838
(Minn.
July
8,
2011)
(No.
A11-1222),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/PetitionforWritofQuoWarrantoA111
222RamseyCountyCourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9GZ-4XX7].
165. Id. at 3.
166. See Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 838–39 (Minn. 2011).
167. Id. at 839–40.
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the legislature had agreed upon the disputed budget bills and enacted
compromise appropriations laws that were made retroactive to July 1,
2011. As was done in the aftermath of the 2005 shutdown, the legislation
expressly “supersede[d] and replace[d] funding authorized by” the Ramsey
County District Court.168 Again, as in 2005, the court ruled the issues were
moot because of this language.169
The court acknowledged that it occasionally decides moot cases that
were “functionally justiciable” when they involved questions that have
statewide significance to Minnesotans.170 It also agreed with the petitioners
that the case was “functionally justiciable.” The majority, nevertheless,
concluded that they “should not exercise [their] discretion to make an
exception to the mootness doctrine in this case.”171 In coming to this
conclusion, the court expressed reluctance to rule on important
constitutional questions unless it was absolutely necessary.172
However, like the Sviggum court, the supreme court also urged the
legislature to act to prevent a future budget crisis.173 Unfortunately, this
advice, which should be viewed as a respectful way of saying “please stop
involving the courts in areas that are constitutionally your duty” has proven
fruitless. Since the 2005 shutdown, there have been multiple legislative
proposals to enact continuing appropriation mechanisms that would
basically keep existing funding levels in effect into the next biennium, with
some specific exceptions, in the event the legislature failed to enact a new
state budget. Despite the obvious need, none of these bills have been
successfully enacted into law. 174
For the third time in a decade, the 2011 dismissal meant Minnesota
appellate courts had once again failed to address the substantive questions
underlying these government gridlock cases. The Minnesota Supreme
Court still has not fully answered whether judicially ordered funding is
168. Id. at 839.
169. Id. at 839–40.
170. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 164, at 34 (quoting State v.
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Minn. 2000)).
171. Limmer, 806 N.W.2d at 839.
172. Id. (citing State v. N. Research Dev. Inst., 294 Minn. 56, 80, 200 N.W.2d 410,
425 (1972)).
173. Id. (explaining that the “legislative and executive branches have the ability to put
mechanisms in place that would ensure that the district court is not again called upon to
authorize expenditures by executive branch agencies in the absence of legislative
appropriations, even if a budget impasse were to occur.”).
174. Colbey Sullivan, Automatic Continuing Appropriations and Government
Shutdowns, App. A, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RES. DEP’T (2011),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/contappr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KW8VHKPX].
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permitted by the Minnesota Constitution, whether the failure to fund
certain governmental functions contravenes the Minnesota Constitution,
and whether the United States Constitution and federal law authorize state
treasury expenditures in the absence of a legislative appropriation. The
court’s approach clearly has prioritized judicial restraint principles and
respect for the other branches of government in these cases. Though the
lack of clarity is frustrating, judicial comity is especially important when the
cases involve separation of powers and other constitutional questions.
Notwithstanding this prior pattern, the court came much closer to
clarifying constitutional funding issues in the most recent case of Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton.175 Indeed, the court’s ruling in Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate should deter future legislatures and governors
from relying upon the Ramsey County District Court to buffer
Minnesotans from state budget impasse consequences.
V. GROWING SKEPTICISM FOR JUDICIALLY-ORDERED FUNDING
On May 30, 2017, Governor Dayton exercised his line-item veto
power to excise funding for the legislature from an appropriations bill. In
making the decision, the governor cited the inclusion of “what he called a
‘poison pill’ provision to a bill that would have eliminated all Minnesota
Department of Revenue funding if [a separate tax cut bill was vetoed].”176
In response, the House of Representatives and State Senate filed a lawsuit
against the governor.177
As result, a Ramsey County District Court judge was once again
presented with a case seeking judicial ordered funding for a governmental
entity. In this case, Ramsey County Chief Judge John H. Guthmann was
asked to consider whether article XI, section 1 of the Minnesota
Constitution prohibits the judiciary from authorizing funding for the
legislature in the absence of an appropriation. The legislature argued that
the governor’s line-item veto power could not be used over the
appropriation without violating the separation-of-powers clause in the
Minnesota Constitution.178
Based on the parties’ stipulation, the lower court found that this issue
was ripe, that the legislature had standing, and that the court could
175.
176.

Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Minn. 2017).
Brian Bakst, Dayton Oks Minn. Agency Spending but Slashes Money to Run
Legislature,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
(May
30,
2017),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/05/30/dayton-ok-complete-minnesota-budget-novetoes [https://perma.cc/DSM7-EQRX].
177. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d. at 612.
178. Id.; see also MINN. CONST. art. III.
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authorize temporary funding for both legislative bodies during the
pendency of the lawsuit.179 In a July 19 order, the district court granted the
legislature’s request to declare the governor’s line-item vetoes null and
void because it impermissibly prevented the legislature from exercising its
constitutional powers and duties.180
On September 8, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an order that
reluctantly allowed the lower court temporary funding stipulation decision
to remain in effect.181 This order also required the parties to file informal
memoranda addressing the constitutionality of the judicially ordered
funding for the legislature, file a joint statement regarding the amount of
carryover funds available to each legislative body, disclose the date by
which carryover funds will be exhausted, and address the anticipated
expenses of the House of Representatives and the State Senate.182
Moreover, unlike the 2011 trial court decision in In re Temporary
Funding—where a request to order mediation was refused—the Minnesota
Supreme Court also ordered the governor and legislature “to participate in
good-faith efforts to resolve this dispute through mediation.183 The court
reasoned, “the other Branches should have the opportunity to resolve this
dispute.184 Notably, Justice Lillehaug—a member of the 2017 Minnesota
Supreme Court that ordered the mediation—was the attorney who
represented the governor in his 2011 request for mediation. Ultimately, in
2017, the mediation was unsuccessful in breaking the stalemate and the
court had to hear arguments, read briefs, and issue an opinion on the issue
of whether the governor constitutionally exercised his line-item veto
authority.
While the court allowed the temporary court-ordered funding to
continue, it expressed concern regarding the lower court order. It agreed
that it is the people of Minnesota whose rights are at stake, but the court
did “not see in the language of Article XI authority for a judicial funding
remedy simply because those interests are at risk.”185 The court cautioned
that “[w]e are unaware of any authority that allows the Judicial Branch to
authorize spending simply because parties ask a court to do so.”186

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d. at 615.
Id.
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 901 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn. 2017).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id.
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On November 16, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its final
decision.187 This order concluded that the governor’s exercise of his lineitem veto power in these circumstances did not violate article III of the
Minnesota Constitution. The ruling overturned the lower court’s
conclusion that the vetoes “‘effectively abolished’ and ‘nullified’” the
legislature by depriving it of the funding needed to perform its core
functions.188 The majority, however, refrained from deciding the issue of
whether the governor’s exercise of the line-item veto violated article I by
unconstitutionally coercing the legislature. Its decision was based on
principles of judicial restraint and respect for the other branches of
government. The supreme court’s conclusion that the legislature had
sufficient carry-over funding to continue its usual functions until it
reconvened in February 2018 was critical to the court’s decision. As a
result of these carryover funds, the court reasoned, that the veto did not
have the effect of abolishing the legislature:
[T]he Legislature has sufficient funding to continue to perform
its functions independently until it reconvenes. Once it
reconvenes, the Legislature can pass additional appropriations
for itself without adhering to the conditions the Governor set in
his veto message, and the respective powers available to the
branches under Article IV can be exercised.189
Despite Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate’s seemingly inconclusive
outcome, the Supreme Court’s overall opinion suggests that future Ramsey
County district courts should exercise greater caution before ordering
treasury disbursements. Part VI discusses this issue in greater detail
immediately below.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
By virtue of containing the state capitol, district court judges in
Ramsey County regularly address complex separation of powers cases.
Both Brayton and In re Temporary Funding were covered extensively in
the state and national media and resulted in the parties who disagreed with
the decisions referring to me as an “activist judge.”190 Both cases were filed
187.
188.
189.
190.

Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 624.
See, e.g., Don Davis, Minnesota Politics: Pawlenty Fights Judicial Legislating,
GRAND FORKS HERALD (Dec. 31, 2009), https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/governm
ent-and-politics/2116445-minnesota-politics-pawlenty-fights-judicial-legislating
[https://perma.cc/JUV7-SH9S] (“It is a conservative candidate’s dream: the chance to
accuse a judge of taking over powers that should be left to legislators and governors.
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at a time when the executive and legislative branches were controlled by
opposing parties and involved a failure of those branches to reach a
compromise that would resolve the remaining appropriation and revenue
raising issues and enact a balanced budget as required by the state
constitution.
In the prior state government shutdown cases handled by Chief Judge
Lawrence Cohen in 2001, and Chief Judge Gregg Johnson in 2005, and
myself in 2011, we issued orders providing funding for core state
government functions. Indeed, these orders were issued despite the clear
command of the Article III, section 1:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of
the others except in the instances expressly provided in this
constitution.191
There are no express provisions in the original Minnesota
Constitution or its amendments that empower the judicial branch to
authorize funding when the other two departments fail to reach a
compromise regarding the biennial state budget so that appropriation bills
passed by the legislature can become law. Additionally, there is no
constitutional or statutory guidance that addresses how to pay for even the
most basic government functions during a budget impasse.
However, even as early as the Sviggum decision, Minnesota courts
recognized the significant separation of powers issues arising from courtordered state treasury disbursements and how they improperly affect
budget negotiation dynamics.192 While not reaching the merits in that case,
the court of appeals cautioned, “[i]f the events of 2005 repeat themselves,
the legislators can raise a timely challenge to seek a judicial remedy for
their asserted injury.”193
This sentiment is echoed in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2011
decision. In a footnote, the majority rejected the suggestion in Justice
Page’s dissent that “by maintaining our traditional institutional reticence on
issues of constitutional magnitude, particularly those that are moot, we
either create the perception of or condone violation of constitutional
Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty, a probable 2012 Republican presidential candidate,
enjoyed that opportunity when Judge Kathleen Gearin ruled that he violated the state
constitution last summer in making budget cuts.”).
191. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
192. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
193. Id. at 323.
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provisions.”194 In his dissent, urging the court to rule on the petition despite
its mootness, Justice Page noted that “for the third time in a decade it fell
to a single district court judge in Ramsey County to decide which
agencies—if any—would continue to operate and, by extension, which
functions—if any—the state government would continue to perform.”195
Justice Page suggested that by involving the judicial branch “to decide the
very issues on which [they] are at an impasse, [they] make the judicial
branch part of that process. . . . [A]t some level, it seems that each of the
two political branches, along with their surrogates, [are] using the judicial
branch as a tool to reach their respective political ends.”196
In 2017, the Minnesota Supreme Court likewise never reached the
ultimate question of whether the judicial branch can order disbursements
from the state treasury without an appropriation under any circumstances.
However, the court included language that should cause district court
judges to hesitate when asked to order temporary funding:
The only conclusion we can draw from the plain language of the
constitution and these decisions is that Article XI, Section 1 of
the Minnesota Constitution does not permit judicially ordered
funding for the Legislative Branch in the absence of an
appropriation.197
In drawing this conclusion, the supreme court relied on its decision in
State v. Dahlgren.198 In that case, the court refused to order funding to pay
for counsel for indigent criminal defendants even though it agreed that the
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel.199
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s strong unambiguous language in
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate hopefully will cause both the executive and
legislative branches of government to avoid the heated conflicts that have
twice pushed them over the shutdown cliff. If they do not, they risk the
possibility that future Ramsey County District Court judges will refuse to
bail them out from their failure to reach some type of budget compromise.
There are other remedies that should be explored by both the
legislative and executive branches. As the Sviggum court explained, “[t]he
legislature could prevent another judicially-mandated disbursement of
public funds without an authorized appropriation by, for example, creating
an emergency fund to keep the government functioning during a
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 839–40 n.1 (Minn. 2011).
Id. at 841.
Id. at 843.
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d at 620.
107 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1961).

Id.
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budgetary impasse or enacting a statute setting forth the procedures to be
followed during a budgetary impasse.”200
Some states, chief among them Wisconsin and Rhode Island, have
enacted default budget statutes.201 These statutes have not significantly
hindered the enactment of timely budgets in these states. In a 2015 law
review article analyzing the long-term effects of government shutdowns on
public trust, David Louk and David Gamage suggest that urging legislators
to rely on their better angels is unlikely to be successful.202 “Rather than
attempting the Sisyphean task of exhorting Democrats and Republicans to
work together on bipartisan budget compromises, we advocate for
implementation of default budget policies that would automatically trigger
when negotiation failure occurs.”203 In their view, which Minnesota’s
repeated shutdown experience bears out, “[i]f we are correct in predicting
that the risk of negotiation failure is here to stay, then reforms should aim
at reducing the harmful consequences of such failure.”204
The supreme court’s decision in Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate
suggests that the Minnesota Legislature would be well-served by adopting
the types of mechanisms discussed by Louk and Gamage.205 Moreover, the
court’s decision to expressly preserve the possibility of judicially ordered
funding as part of its opinion nonetheless indicates that the overall effect of
Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate is to constrain the expansive funding
orders previously authorized by Ramsey County District Courts:
Our decision today should not be read to foreclose the
possibility of a judicial remedy in a different situation. . . .
Minnesotans have a constitutional right to three independent
branches of government, each functioning at a level sufficient to
allow the exercise of the constitutional powers committed to
each branch for the “security, benefit, and protection of the
people, in whom all political power is inherent.”206
This passage suggests that the courts may have a funding role if the
legislature does not have reserve funds or newly appropriated money to

200. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
201. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5); 35 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 35-3-19 (West 2019, Westlaw through Ch. 20 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.). These
statutes are discussed in Sullivan, supra note 174.
202. David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns;
Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 236–37 (2015).
203. Id. at 237.
204. Id.
205. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 625 (Minn. 2017).
206. Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1).
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legislatively function. It also is a reminder that all three co-equal branches
must have funding to exercise their constitutional powers.
At a minimum, given Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate’s totality,
future Ramsey County District Court judges will be more hesitant to order
Minnesota Management and Budget to disburse public funds without
appropriations and more likely to limit any expenditures that are ordered.
The consequences of this shift would be widespread for Minnesotans.
More facilities would be closed, more state employees would be laid off,
more agencies would cease operations, more private businesses would
suffer, and the people of Minnesota would be more adversely impacted.
Even before Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate, I questioned whether
I had ordered expenditures for too many government functions
considering the constitutional issues raised in the quo warranto petitions. I
wondered what I would do if a balanced budget was not enacted before
my order expired on July 31, 2011. I became increasingly concerned that
my order was too broad. In an interview given two days after the shutdown
ended, I explained that I thought judicial involvement in budgeting was a
negative consequence of our political system becoming more divisive. As a
result, some elected officials have lost sight of the effect that zero-sum
politicking has on citizens who may not pay significant attention to
government.207
Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate should serve as a valuable guide for
future district court judges put in the difficult position of sorting out
government gridlock. For legislators and governors, it should serve as a
warning that the consequences of future impasses, in the absence of a
default budgeting law, will be more pronounced, create greater hardship
for Minnesotans, and increase the public’s frustration with government
institutions. It should inspire serious research, thoughtful debate, and the
careful enactment of laws that prevent judicially ordered funding divorced
from the legislature’s public policy setting prerogative. Ultimately, our
system of elected government demands that the selection of policies and
balancing of stakeholder interests belong with those who write the laws,
rather than those who apply it.

207. See Grovum, supra note 127 (“It’s easy to say people are becoming less willing to
compromise. Compromise doesn’t mean you give up your principles. Compromise to me
means you realistically look at your position, one, see how realistic it is that it can succeed
at this time. You don’t give up your position. And then you look at, all right . . . how much
is it going to hurt the state if I just stick with my position? How much should I basically
reach some common agreement that isn’t exactly what I wanted, what either side
wanted?”).
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